Abstract. This paper models quality improvements when multiple quality levels can sell due to di¤erences in consumers' valuations of quality improvements. Firms can collude to price discriminate so that consumers with high valuations pay a price premium, while others receive a quality level below the highest available. Imposing minimum quality standards or price ceilings can ensure that only the highest quality level of each product is sold. Such intervention reduces the quality-adjusted price paid by consumers but also reduces the incentives for …rms to innovate. When enough consumers have high valuations, such intervention must be welfare reducing due to reduced innovation. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: O31, L16
Introduction
Improvements in the speed of computers and in the quality of other hightechnology products have been amazing. However, the bene…ts of faster speed and higher quality di¤er across consumers. Not all consumers buy the best because the best generally carries a higher price and not everyone …nds the higher quality justi…es the higher price. For many high-tech products, some consumers purchase quality levels below the highest available.
The property that some consumers do not bene…t from the latest technologies is a distortion that might warrant intervention. Holding all else equal, welfare could be improved by imposing a price ceiling su¢cient to induce all consumers to purchase the state-of-the-art. But all else is not equal. The pro…ts …rms will earn entice them to develop new technologies. While regulation can generate static bene…ts for consumers, those gains would come at the expense of losses due to fewer innovations. Past analysis has not addressed this reduction in innovation. This paper determines whether the static gains or the dynamic losses dominate and under what conditions.
In my model, consumers di¤er in how much they value quality improvements. Firms can construct price-quality schedules such that consumers self select. Quality enthusiasts pay a higher price for a higher quality level, while other consumers may purchase quality levels below the highest available. The fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts determines whether …rms induce consumer types to separate, since separation means delayed sales to low valuation consumers for the most recent innovator.
When too few consumers value quality improvements highly, only the highest quality level of each product sells in equilibrium. The rate of innovation does not depend on how many consumers are quality enthusiasts within this lower range. When enough consumers value quality improvements highly, however, both the highest and the second highest quality level of each product sell in equilibrium as producers set prices that induce consumer types to separate. The rate of innovation then increases with the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts within this upper range, as larger pro…ts provide a greater reward to innovation.
The incentives of …rms to induce separation do not always match welfare objectives. When …rms induce separation, lifetime utility for consumers can be above or below the level that would be enjoyed in the absence of price discrimination. High valuation consumers pay more and low valuation consumers receive a lower quality. However, the larger reward to innova-tion generates a faster rate of innovation. The bene…ts of faster innovation can more than o¤set the losses due to paying a higher quality-adjusted price when enough consumers are quality enthusiasts. Thus, government intervention to curtail price discrimination is not always warranted, as both types of consumers can be better o¤ under price discrimination due to the faster rate of innovation. Examining only static e¤ects risks exaggerating the need for regulation. This policy implication is the main conclusion of the paper.
This paper is unique in employing a model of innovation in which multiple quality levels sell to address issues of government policy intervention. The necessary ingredients are consumers that di¤er in their valuation of quality and a rate of innovation that responds to pro…t incentives. In contrast to representative agent models of quality improvement -such as Grossman and Helpman (1991) , Segerstrom (1991) , and Aghion and Howitt (1992) -here consumers di¤er in their valuation of quality, so that multiple quality levels may sell in equilibrium. In contrast to static models of quality di¤erentia-tion where multiple quality levels do sell in equilibrium -such as Jaskold Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Sutton (1982, 1983 ) -here consumer heterogeneity in ‡uences the rate of quality improvement through pro…t incentives. In contrast to models of antitrust policy with a subsequent innovation -such as Chang (1995) and Green and Scotchmer (1995) -here consumers di¤er in their valuation of quality and quality can be repeatedly improved.
Section 2 speci…es the maximization problem for heterogeneous consumers, where consumer types are based on the valuation of quality improvements. Section 3 considers how …rms choose prices and innovation intensities. Section 4 …nds the solution for a steady-state pooling equilibrium and for a steady-state separating equilibrium, including the condition for whether …rms induce consumer types to separate. Section 5 determines how the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts a¤ects the rate of innovation and aggregate expenditure. Section 6 performs welfare analysis and explores the potential for government intervention to improve welfare. Section 7 concludes. Proofs appear in the Appendix. A web appendix with additional material is located at http://economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu/pdf/glass/incsup.pdf.
Heterogeneous Consumers
The speci…cation of the consumer's problem follows Grossman and Helpman (1991) but allows the valuation of quality improvements to vary across consumer types. The economy is composed of two types of consumers, ! 2 (L; H), labeled low and high based on the willingness to pay for quality improvements¸!. Consumers choose from a continuum of products j 2 [0; 1]. Consumers di¤er in their assessment of how much better each quality level m of product j is than the previous quality level m ¡ 1. Quality level m of product j provides quality q m (j)´(¸!) m as perceived by consumers of type !.
1 By the de…nition of quality improvement, all consumers agree that new generations are better than the old:
High type consumers (quality enthusiasts) value quality improvement more than low type consumers:¸H >¸L. A fraction f H of consumers are high type, while the remaining f L´1 ¡ f H are low type. For symmetry, the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts is assumed to be the same for all products. Consumers have equal incomes for simplicity. If quality enthusiasts are wealthier, then statements about the fraction of consumers should be reinterpreted as applying to the fraction of spending by these consumers.
A consumer of type ! has additively separable intertemporal preferences given by lifetime utility
where ½ is the common subjective discount factor. Instantaneous utility is
where (¸!) m is the assessment by type ! consumers of quality level m and x ! m (j; t) is consumption by type ! consumers of quality level m of product j at time t.
A consumer of type ! maximizes lifetime utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. Since preferences are homothetic, aggregate demand for each consumer type is found by maximizing lifetime utility subject to the aggregate intertemporal budget constraint
where R(t) = R t 0 r(s)ds is the cumulative interest rate up to time t and A ! (0) = f ! A(0) is the aggregate value of initial asset holdings by type ! consumers. Individuals hold assets in the form of ownership in …rms, but with a diversi…ed portfolio, any capital losses appear as capital gains elsewhere so only initial asset holdings remain. Aggregate labor income of all type ! consumers is Y ! (t) = f ! Lw(t), where w(t) is the wage at time t and L is the labor supply. Thus Lw(t) is total labor income at time t and f ! Lw(t) is the share of total labor income belonging to type ! consumers. Normalize the wage to one: w (t) = 1. Aggregate expenditure of all type ! consumers is
where p m (j; t) is the price of quality level m of product j at time t, E ! (t) = f ! E (t), and E (t) is aggregate expenditure. A consumer's maximization problem can be broken into three stages: the allocation of lifetime wealth across time, the allocation of expenditure at each instant across products, and the allocation of expenditure at each instant for each product across available quality levels. In the …nal stage, consumers of each type allocate expenditure for each product at each instant to the quality level f m ! (j; t) o¤ering the lowest quality-adjusted price, p m (j; t)= (¸!) m . Settle indi¤erence in favor of the higher quality level so the quality level selected is unique. The steady-state follows Grossman and Helpman (1991) , but due to the di¤erent valuations of quality improvements, consumers can disagree on which quality level provides the lowest quality-adjusted price.
In the second stage, consumers of each type then evenly spread expenditure across the unit measure of all products, E ! (j; t) = E ! (t), as the elasticity of substitution is constant at unity. Consumers of type ! demand
units of quality level f m ! (j; t) of product j and no units of other quality levels of that product. Thus, imposing the expression for consumer demand (5) and separating terms, instantaneous utility (2) becomes
and lifetime utility (1) becomes
by substituting for instantaneous utility. In the …rst stage, consumers of each type evenly spread lifetime expenditure across time, E ! (t) = E ! , as the utility function for each consumer type is time separable and the aggregate price levels (the aggregate high quality price level and aggregate low quality price level) will be shown to not vary across time log p e m (j; t) = log p e m (j). Since aggregate expenditure is constant across time, the interest rate at each point in time re ‡ects the discount rate r (t) = ½, so R(t) = ½t in the intertemporal budget constraint. The model keeps these two stages simple to focus attention on the …nal stage, where quality choice is determined. Whether enough consumers are quality enthusiasts determines whether …rms choose prices that cause consumer types to separate, as seen by characterizing …rm behavior.
Firm Behavior
To produce a quality level of a product, a …rm must …rst design it. Firms are willing to endure the costs of developing higher quality levels of existing products because they earn pro…ts in the product market if successful. The potential for quality improvement is unbounded.
Innovation
Modeling innovation success as a continuous Poisson process follows the assumptions made by Grossman and Helpman (1991) . Innovation resembles a lottery: …rms endure a cost for a chance at winning a payo¤. For any …rm, undertaking innovation intensity e ¶ for a time interval dt requires ae ¶dt units of labor and leads to success with probability e ¶dt. An innovation success means that the …rm discovers how to produce the quality level m, where the previous quality level in the industry was m¡1. A higher investment in innovation yields a higher probability of success, but no level of investment in innovation can guarantee success. Only the current level of innovation activity determines the chance of innovation success, since innovation is memory-less for simplicity. Assume innovation races occur simultaneously for all products, with all …rms able to target the quality level above the current highest. Finally, assume free entry into innovation, with an endless pool of potential innovators.
Given the innovation intensity ¶ of other …rms, a …rm's strategy is to pick an innovation intensity e ¶ and a price p to charge for its product once successful in innovation. Look for the steady-state equilibrium in stationary strategies, where …rms' strategies are time invariant (but may depend on the current state of the economy). Firms already producing a quality level of a product can be shown to not engage in further innovation on that product -the proof mirrors that in Grossman and Helpman (1991) . Producing …rms lose value when subsequent innovation is successful, so other …rms stand to gain more (net) and undertake innovation. 2 Therefore, a …rm's problem can be broken into an innovation stage and a production stage.
In the innovation stage, a …rm endures innovation costs of ae ¶dt and gains an expected reward of ve ¶dt (enjoys gains v with probability e ¶dt). Each …rm chooses its intensity of innovation e ¶ to maximize its expected gain from innovation.
The term e ¡ ¶t captures the probability that no other …rm will have succeeded in innovating in the same industry prior to time t. Each nonproducing …rm chooses its innovation intensity to maximize the di¤erence between the expected reward and the costs of innovation. Firms engage in innovation with nonnegative intensity whenever the expected gains are no less than their costs. To generate …nite rates of innovation, the expected gains must not exceed their cost, with equality when innovation occurs with positive intensity.
The product market outcome determines the expected gains from innovation. The value of a producing …rm is the present discounted stream of its instantaneous pro…ts, where its product is continually targeted for quality improvement by nonproducing …rms.
Production
In the production stage, each producing …rm chooses the price of its product to maximize its value, given the prices and innovation intensities of other …rms. At any moment, at most two di¤erent quality levels of any product sell due to the two types of consumers. The two quality levels are the two highest existing quality levels, since all quality levels cost the same to produce but consumers value higher quality levels more. Label the two quality levels of a product produced at any point in time high and low, although the labeling of a given quality level changes over time (high when initially invented, low after subsequent innovation).
Depending on the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts, separation or pooling of consumer types may occur (details are provided in the next subsection). If separating, the most recently successful innovator produces the high quality level and the previous innovator produces the low quality level. If pooling, the most recently successful innovator sells the high quality level, the only quality level that sells of that product.
Under pooling, a successful innovator becomes the top …rm and the previous top …rm is priced out of the market. The reward to successful innovation when pooling prevails is the present discounted value of pro…ts from selling the high quality level to all consumers until rival innovation occurs and terminates the pro…t stream.
At each instant, the …rm earns instantaneous pro…ts ¼ P if rival innovation has not yet occurred, where ¶ P is the innovation intensity under pooling. Under separation, a successful innovator becomes the top …rm, the previous top …rm becomes the trailing …rm, and the previous trailing …rm is priced out of the market. The reward to successful innovation when separation prevails is the present discounted value of pro…ts from selling the high quality level until rival innovation knocks the …rm down to the trailing position.
At each instant, the top …rm earns instantaneous pro…ts ¼ 1 if rival innovation has not yet occurred, where ¶ S is the innovation intensity under separation. Upon rival innovation, the …rm maintains only the trailing …rm value (until rival innovation occurs again and terminates the pro…t stream).
At each instant, the trailing …rm earns instantaneous pro…ts ¼ 2 if rival innovation has not yet occurred. Combine the two valuation equations by substituting v 2 into v 1 , leaving the value of a top …rm under separation as its discounted stream of expected instantaneous pro…ts from …rst selling high quality and then low quality.
Here, the erosion of …rm value due to technological depreciation occurs gradually with repeated innovations necessary to push a quality level of a product into obsolescence.
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Firms know the two di¤erent valuations of quality present in the population,¸L and¸H, as well as the fraction of consumers of each type, f L and f H , but cannot observe the willingness to pay for quality of any individual consumer. Thus, if …rms want to sell di¤erent quality levels to di¤erent consumer types, they must o¤er prices such that consumers self-select (second-degree price discrimination).
If the high quality level is priced at a premium of p 1 =p 2 ·¸H relative to the low quality level, high type consumers purchase the high quality level while low type consumers purchase the low quality level. In addition, if the low quality level is priced at a premium of p 2 =p 3 ·¸L relative to the quality level just out of the market, low type consumers purchase the low quality level rather than the quality level below it. Finally, the lowest price for the quality level just out of the market that would achieve nonnegative pro…ts p 3 = w = 1, ties down the highest prices for the high and the low quality levels that induce consumer types to separate: p 1 =¸H¸L and p 2 =¸L. More generally, the incentive compatibility constraint for consumers of type !, p k =p k+n · (¸!) n , indicates that consumers will buy quality level k rather than k + n if the price ratio is no more than their willingness to pay for the n additional quality increments.
Normalize the labor requirement in production to one. De…ne ± L´1 =¸L and ± H´1 =¸H. Let E P and E S refer to aggregate expenditure E under pooling or separation, respectively. Under pooling, the top …rm charges price p P =¸L and makes sales x P = E P =p P = E P ± L , yielding instantaneous pro…ts.
The top …rm engages in limit pricing against its inactive rival one quality level below. Both high and low type consumers buy the highest quality level available.
Under separation, the top …rm charges price p 1 =¸H¸L and makes sales
yielding instantaneous pro…ts.
The trailing …rm charges price p 2 =¸L and makes sales
The trailing …rm engages in limit pricing against its inactive rival one quality level below, while the top …rm engages in limit pricing against the trailing …rm. High type consumers buy the high quality level and low type consumers buy the low quality level.
Inserting pro…ts into producing …rm valuation gives the value of a top …rm under pooling
and under separation.
Thus the innovation condition (9) when the rate of innovation is positive becomes
due to the trait that the top …rm can essentially dictate whether separation or pooling occurs, as seen by considering the equilibrium of the repeated pricing game.
Implicit Collusion
The pooling prices described above are the Nash equilibrium of the static pricing game. Given that the trailing …rm is charging a price equal to one, the top …rm's best response is p P =¸L. The top …rm would not want to lower its price due to industry demand being unit elastic. Nor would the top …rm want to raise its price and thus lose low type consumers to the trailing …rm (provided few enough consumers are quality enthusiasts f H < d f H as de…ned in the web appendix). Similarly, given that the top …rm is charging the price p P =¸L, the trailing …rm's best response is to charge a price of one, its marginal cost. If the trailing …rm were to lower its price below marginal costs, it would generate negative pro…ts, and raising its price would generate no sales.
The separating prices described above are not a Nash equilibrium of the static pricing game. Given that the trailing …rm is charging the price p 2 =¸L, the top …rm's best response is p 1 =¸H¸L. The top …rm would not want to raise its price and thus lose high type consumers to the trailing …rm and it would not want to lower its price either due to industry demand being unit elastic. But, given that the top …rm is charging the price p 1 =¸H¸L, the trailing …rm's best response is not p 2 =¸L. The trailing …rm would have an incentive to lower its price in…nitesimally below¸L and capture the entire market: high type consumers would then buy the low quality level aş H¸L = ³¸L ¡ "´>¸H. A separating equilibrium can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium by the …rms playing trigger strategies to support implicit collusion in the repeated game. In the repeated game, the top …rm can deter the trailing …rm from undercutting its price by threatening to punish any deviation. Restrict attention to simple strategy pro…les, which specify the same punishment after any deviation and any history of actions. Suppose punishment can occur only after some lag 0 <`< 1.
4 Punishment can take the form of reverting to the one-shot Nash equilibrium of pooling. Under pooling, even when the trailing …rm prices at its marginal cost of one, the top …rm can price at p P =¸L and capture the entire market due to its quality advantage. The ability of the trailing …rm to shut down and thus ensure zero pro…ts prevents any more severe punishment.
At time ¿ , the top …rm chooses the price p 1 and the trailing …rm picks the price p 2 if both …rms have always done so in the history up to time ¿ ¡`; otherwise, the top …rm would pick p P and the trailing …rm would price at its cost of one during the permanent punishment phase. The punishment phase is subgame perfect as the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game (pooling) is merely repeated. Implicit collusion is subgame perfect if and only if both …rms gain a higher value from cooperating than from deviating.
Given the top …rm's strategy, the trailing …rm never (for …nite discount rate and su¢ciently short lag in retaliation) deviates from p 2 , as higher in-stantaneous pro…ts would require sacri…ce of future pro…ts following retaliation. For the trailing …rm to cooperate, its value v 2 from cooperation must exceed the value v D stemming from a deviation. A trailing …rm that defects earns instantaneous deviating pro…ts until either the top …rm retaliates or rival innovation occurs and terminates the pro…t stream.
At each instant, the defecting trailing …rm earns instantaneous pro…ts ¼ D if rival innovation has not yet occurred and the lag until retaliation has not yet expired. Instantaneous pro…ts for a trailing …rm that deviates are maximized by charging a deviation price p D =¸L ¡ " (in…nitesimally below p 2 =¸L) and thus capturing the entire market. The instantaneous pro…ts the trailing …rm earns when deviating prior to when the top …rm can retaliate are
Once the lag has passed, the top …rm retaliates by charging the price p P forever so the trailing …rm earns no further pro…ts. When cooperating, the trailing …rm sells only to low type consumers, so instantaneous pro…ts are lower than when defecting (prior to retaliation) but the expected duration of pro…ts is shorter when defecting due to retaliation by the top …rm after lag`. For cooperation to be supported, the value under separation must exceed the value under deviating v 2 > v D , which by using the expressions for the relevant values and pro…ts, simpli…es to
H and taking logs of both sides shows that cooperation requires that the lag must be su¢ciently short.
As the fraction of consumers who are high type f H becomes larger, the labor supply L larger, or the resource requirement in innovation a smaller (through increasing ¶ S ), the maximum lag shrinks. The temptation for the trailing …rm to deviate grows with f H as the deviation value from selling to the entire market becomes large relative to the value from serving only low type consumers. This temptation shrinks for faster ¶ S due to the chance that its pro…t stream will have been terminated by innovation before the punishment kicks in.
In the limit as the lag becomes in…nitesimally small`! 0, the trailing …rm always cooperates so the top …rm can always induce separation. If separation leads to a greater …rm value, the top …rm chooses to induce separation. Separation occurs whenever the value of a top …rm is higher under separation v S > v P , while pooling occurs otherwise v S · v P . If separation generates a higher value, the top …rm will follow its strategy pro…le described above.
Technically, a continuum of separating equilibria could be supported. Implicit collusion can support any
The separating equilibrium refers to one with the highest price levels, which yields the highest pro…ts for both …rms and thus the fastest innovation. Since pro…ts are highest, …rms will select the greatest degree of collusion, unless government antitrust concerns intervene.
Solution
In equilibrium, high and low type consumers maximize their lifetime utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, …rms maximize their value given prices and innovation intensities chosen by other …rms and labor markets clear. Provided the economy has enough resources to support a positive rate of innovation, in equilibrium, producing …rms earn pro…ts su¢cient in expectation to compensate for their innovation expenses. Rival innovation eventually eliminates the pro…t stream from production, but not immediately if multiple quality levels sell in equilibrium.
In a steady-state equilibrium with positive innovation, a constant fraction of all products experience quality improvement at each instant. This section …nds the rate of innovation and aggregate expenditure under pooling, where all consumers buy the same quality level at the same price, and under separation, where …rms induce consumer types to separate through price discrimination. Then the condition on the fraction of quality enthusiasts needed to generate separation rather than pooling is derived.
Pooling Equilibrium
For the pooling equilibrium, insert the producing …rm valuation equation (17) into the innovation equilibrium condition (9) to yield the valuation condition, which requires the expected reward from innovation to equal its cost.
Then impose the resource constraint, which requires the labor demand for innovation and production to equal the labor supply.
The pooling equilibrium is the aggregate expenditure
and rate of innovation
that solve this pair of equations. The pooling equilibrium resembles the solution for homogeneous consumers all having willingness to pay for quality improvements¸L, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991) , because prices are determined by the willingness to pay for quality of low type consumers. Even though some consumers are willing to pay more for quality, in the pooling equilibrium, their higher willingness to pay for quality is not revealed.
Separating Equilibrium
For the separating equilibrium, insert the producing …rm valuation equation (18) into the innovation equilibrium condition (9) to yield the valuation condition.
Then impose the resource constraint.
The separating equilibrium is the aggregate expenditure and rate of innovation that solve this pair of equations. The fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts determines whether the pooling or the separating equilibrium emerges, as explored next.
Condition for Separation
What fraction of consumers must be quality enthusiasts to give …rms suf…cient motive to induce consumer types to separate? Examining …rm optimization leads to the conditions for separation to prevail. If the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts is large enough, then separation results, as separation yields higher value for the most recent innovator than pooling.
Setting the value of a top …rm under separation (18) equal to under pooling (17) for a given rate of innovation determines the boundary fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts needed for …rms to induce consumer types to separate.
29)
If too small a fraction of consumers are quality enthusiasts, then …rms do not induce consumer types to separate: to gain the added premium from a small fraction of high type consumers, a successful innovator would sacri…ce pro…ts from selling to a large fraction of low type consumers.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium): If enough consumers are quality enthusiasts, f H > f ¤ ; a separating equilibrium prevails: the real expenditure and the rate of innovation solve the resource constraint (28) and the valuation condition (27). Otherwise, a pooling equilibrium prevails, with real expenditure (25) and rate of innovation (26) .
Innovation
This section determines how the equilibrium rate of innovation and aggregate expenditure respond to changes in the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts.
In a pooling equilibrium, the price charged for the high quality level is determined by the willingness to pay for quality of low type consumers. While some consumers do value quality improvements more, they do not pay any more in a pooling equilibrium. Thus, having more quality enthusiasts does not increase pro…ts and thus does not increase the reward to innovation or the rate of innovation.
In a separating equilibrium, however, high type consumers pay a premium re ‡ecting their greater willingness to pay for quality. Thus, having more quality enthusiasts increases pro…ts from selling high quality levels and decreases pro…ts from selling low quality levels, with a net positive e¤ect on the reward to innovation when separation prevails, as established through di¤erentiation in the proof to Proposition 2 below (see the Appendix for the proof). Consequently, shifting the distribution toward quality enthusiasts increases the rate of innovation when more than one quality level sells but has no e¤ect when only one quality level sells.
What are the upper and lower bounds on the rate of innovation and aggregate expenditure under separation? How do these bounds compare to the rate of innovation and aggregate expenditure under pooling? Establishing these bounds will complete the description of how aggregate expenditure and innovation vary with f H and thus help in establishing the welfare results to follow.
In the limit as the distribution becomes degenerate on high type consumers (the upper bound), the rate of innovation under separation exceeds the rate of innovation under pooling
and aggregate expenditure under separation approaches aggregate expenditure under pooling.
In this upper limit, the rate of innovation under separation exceeds even that for a pooling equilibrium with all quality enthusiasts (L=a) ³ 1 ¡ ± H´¡ ½± H . This di¤erence arises because the presence of low type consumers allows the top …rm to extract a higher price (through implicit collusion with the trailing …rm) than when there are only high type consumers. The separating equilibrium does not exist when all consumers are quality enthusiasts (f H = 1) because there are no low type consumers remaining.
In the limit as the distribution approaches the lower boundary for separation f ¤ , the rate of innovation under separation approaches the rate of innovation under pooling
and aggregate expenditure under separation exceeds aggregate expenditure under pooling.
The rate of innovation in the separating equilibrium lies between the bounds of a minimum equal to the rate of innovation under pooling and a maximum above the rate of innovation under pooling:
Similarly, aggregate expenditure in the separating equilibrium lies between the bounds of a minimum equal to aggregate expenditure under pooling and a maximum above aggregate expenditure under pooling: E P · E S · E. However, the extreme f H ! 1 where the rate of innovation is the highest ¶ S ! ¶ is where aggregate expenditure is the lowest E S ! E P , and the extreme
where aggregate expenditure is the highest E S ! E is where the rate of innovation is the lowest ¶ S ! ¶ P within a separating equilibrium. Overall, how does the rate of innovation respond to increases in the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts?
Proposition 2 (Comparative Statics): Starting from zero, as the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts rises, the rate of innovation and real expenditure initially remain constant at the levels given by (26) and (25), and then eventually the rate of innovation rises and real expenditure falls once more than one quality level sells.
The next section analyzes the impact on welfare of permitting separation, for parameters such that separation would occur.
Welfare
Given that the rate of innovation and aggregate expenditure when separation prevails is higher than the rate of innovation were pooling to prevail, is welfare higher under separation than under pooling? Would government policies such as minimum quality standards or price ceilings necessarily lower welfare by reducing the number of di¤erent quality levels of each product selling in equilibrium? Not necessarily: while the rate of innovation is faster when separation prevails, under separation high type consumers pay a higher price for the highest quality level available while low type consumers settle for a lower quality level relative to the quality frontier.
Welfare Expressions
By the law of large numbers, the expected number of quality improvements in period t is m(t) = ¶t. In a pooling equilibrium, instantaneous utility (6) for type ! consumers is
and lifetime utility (7) for type ! consumers is
The second term is the positive contribution of expected quality improvements to lifetime utility; the last term is the negative impact of price. The middle term is larger for high type consumers than for low type consumers due to their high valuation of quality. Firm pro…ts do not contribute to welfare because they are o¤set (in present discounted value terms) by costs of innovation due to free entry into innovation. Under separation, instantaneous utility (6) for type ! consumers is
Compared to lifetime utility under pooling, under separation all consumers bene…t from a higher rate of innovation and larger aggregate expenditure but high type consumers su¤er from a higher price and low type consumers su¤er from a lower quality level (the ¡ log¸! term).
Welfare Comparison
De…ne ¢U !´U ! S ¡ U ! P as the di¤erence in lifetime utility between separation and pooling, for a given set of parameters. Lifetime utility for type ! consumers is higher under separation if and only if the di¤erence
is positive, where
is the di¤erence in aggregate expenditure between separation and pooling. The di¤erence in utility is the sum of three e¤ects: di¤erence in expenditure, rate of innovation, and price (or quality received relative to the highest available). The negative e¤ect of higher price (or lower quality level relative to the highest available) is constant across time. The bene…ts of a faster rate of innovation grow over time as a greater di¤erence develops in the highest quality level expected to be available. For lifetime utility to be higher under separation than pooling, the positive level and growth e¤ects from larger aggregate expenditure and faster innovation under separation must o¤set this negative level e¤ect.
Proposition 3 (Welfare): When the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts is near the lower bound for separation to occur f H ! f ¤ , consumers of both types experience a fall in lifetime utility from separation. When enough consumers are quality enthusiasts f H ! 1, consumers of both types experience a rise in lifetime utility from separation.
In the limit as only enough consumers are quality enthusiasts to support separation f H ! f ¤ , the increase in aggregate expenditure fails to counter the negative level e¤ect of higher prices for high type consumers and consuming below the highest quality level available for low type consumers. In the limit as all consumers are quality enthusiasts f H ! 1, the faster rate of innovation is enough to counter the negative level e¤ect of higher prices for high type consumers and consuming below the highest quality level available for low type consumers. Figure 1 shows how lifetime utility initially is higher under pooling than under separation and eventually higher under separation than under pooling, as the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts increases. The proof of Proposition 3 establishes these traits. Due to the switch in welfare:
Corollary 4 The fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts that is needed for consumers to bene…t from separation is larger than that needed for separation to occur e f > f ¤ .
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Thus, …rms induce separation for some range (f H just above f ¤ but below e f ) where the lifetime utility of both type consumers would be higher if separation did not occur. This property introduces a limited role for government intervention to curtail separation when separation reduces welfare.
*** FIGURE 1 HERE ***
Government Intervention
Accordingly, minimum quality standards (or imposing a price ceiling at¸L) can potentially reduce the rate of innovation but still raise welfare: if the government bans sales of anything but the highest quality level available (and the ban binds), …rms will slow down their attempts to improve the quality of products. Within the range of f H just above f ¤ where welfare is lower for both type consumers under separation than under pooling, government intervention could raise the welfare of both types. If the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts is not much more than required for …rms to induce separation, the slower rate of quality improvement is more than o¤set by a better pricing outcome for high type consumers and no quality distortion for low type consumers. Thus, minimum quality standards can be welfare enhancing even though innovation su¤ers.
However, there is no guarantee that quality standards or price ceilings will be welfare improving -the outcome depends on the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts. Within the range of f H just below one where welfare is higher for both type consumers under separation than under pooling, the government should not intervene to induce pooling because doing so would lower the welfare of both consumer types. The analysis performed here captures how separation provides greater incentives for innovation. Static analysis ignoring how the rate of innovation responds to pro…t incentives risks overstating the role for government intervention by failing to consider a positive aspect of separation.
Conclusion
Multiple quality levels of many high-tech products sell, as consumers' valuations of quality contain some idiosyncratic component. How does the rate of quality improvement of high-tech products respond to not all consumers buying the best version? How does the rate of quality improvement respond if the government intervenes to prevent all but the highest quality level of each product from selling? This paper provides some intriguing answers to these questions.
Quality enthusiasts buy higher quality levels and pay a higher price, if a su¢cient fraction of consumers are quality enthusiasts so that …rms induce consumer types to separate. If too few consumers are quality enthusiasts, then …rms do not induce consumer types to separate: all consumers purchase the highest quality level available of each product. In a pooling equilibrium, increasing the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts does not create any more incentive for innovation as di¤erences in willingness to pay for quality are not revealed.
Once enough consumers are quality enthusiasts, a separating equilibrium emerges. In a separating equilibrium, increasing the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts does create more incentive for innovation as the higher willingness to pay for quality of high type consumers is revealed. Consequently, the fraction of consumers who are quality enthusiasts can alter the rate of innovation, but only if multiple quality levels are sold in equilibrium.
Regulations can have di¤ering e¤ects on welfare depending on the distribution of consumer types (through e¤ects on the rate of innovation). Within the range where multiple quality levels sell, for some range consumers are all worse o¤ under separation than they would be under pooling and the government could potentially increase welfare by imposing minimum quality standards or price ceilings. However, for some range consumers are all better o¤ under separation than they would be under pooling and so the government should not intervene. Consumers can be better o¤ under separation if the gain from faster innovation o¤sets the static loss from paying a higher price or consuming a quality level below the highest available. Understanding that the higher prices paid under separation help support a faster rate of innovation is vital for avoiding interventions that would reduce welfare.
Beyond the policy implications examined in this paper, this model proves useful for examining other issues that arise where multiple quality levels sell, especially international trade issues. Glass (1997 Glass ( , 1998 , Saggi (1998), and Yang and Maskus (1999) use this model as the basis for models of international trade, foreign direct investment, or licensing between countries. Analysis with multiple quality levels permits the quality mix of production to vary across countries. Resource accumulation and government policies then alter the rate of quality improvement and the allocation of production of di¤erent quality levels across countries.
A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that the economy is currently in a pooling equilibrium, so the rate of innovation under pooling ¶ P is taken as given. For a …rm to be indi¤er-ent between pooling and separation, the …rm must receive the same value v S ( ¶ P ) = v P ( ¶ P ) = a at the boundary f ¤ . To solve v S ( ¶ P ) = a for f H , substitute (28) and ¶ S = ¶ P into the expression for the value of a top …rm under separation (18) and set equal to a to achieve the condition.
Substituting ¶ P = (L=a) (26) and solving for f H generates the boundary distribution f ¤ .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
By Proposition 1 and aggregate expenditure (25) and innovation (26), @E P =@f H = @ ¶ P =@f H = 0 for the pooling equilibrium 0 < f H · f ¤ . For the separating equilibrium f ¤ < f H < 1, write the system of the resource constraint and the valuation condition aş b 12 =¸H¸La > 0 b 21 = ½
In the limit as all consumers are quality enthusiasts f H ! 1, aggregate expenditure under separation returns to the level of aggregate expenditure under pooling ¢E = 0. Thus, lifetime utility is higher under separation
when the rate of innovation under separation exceeds the rate of innovation under pooling by more than the discount rate.
The rate of innovation rises by more than the discount rate ³ ¶ S ¡ ¶ P´= ½ > 1, so lifetime utility rises ¢U ! > 0.
